Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes by Simon, William H.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2004 
Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes 
William H. Simon 
Columbia Law School, wsimon@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA & JOANNE SCOTT, EDS., HART PUBLISHING, 2006; 
COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-79 (2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1341 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 












PROFESSOR WILLIAM SIMON 








This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 
Social Science Research Network electronic library at: 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=602626 
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. Thanks for help and encouragement
to Paul Adler, Barbara Fried, the Hewlett Foundation, Chuck Sabel, Joanne Scott, Neil Walker,
and participants in discussions at Cambridge University, Columbia Law School and the State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School. 
1 The idea that TPS and related engineering ideas have important implications for public
institutions comes from Charles F Sabel, ‘Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of
Economic Development’ in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds) Handbook of Economic
Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
2 See eg, Michael C Dorf and Charles F Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267; John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice
and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Joanne Scott and David
M Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’
(2002) 8 European Law Journal. 1. The case for the term pragmatism rests on the convergence
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Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory
and Rolling Rule Regimes
WILLIAM H SIMON*
CONTEMPORARY ENGINEERING HAS produced distinctive ideas aboutorganisation. These ideas have focused most on economic produc-tion, especially manufacturing, but they have broader relevance. I
propose to show in this essay that a specific cluster of these ideas known as
the Toyota Production System (TPS), or more generally, as ‘lean produc-
tion’, contradicts basic premises of mainstream legal theory and implies a
quite different jurisprudence. 
I discuss TPS as if it were a legal system, but I am not interested in defend-
ing this characterisation on any but heuristic grounds. The jurisprudential
implications of TPS are interesting because these ideas seem to underlie, in
more fragmented and amorphous form, some important recent public law
developments, especially in health-and-safety regulation and the delivery of
public services. The engineering perspective thus has the potential both to
clarify the basis of these developments and to suggest how they may evolve.1
The mainstream perspective to which I contrast Toyota jurisprudence is a
set of premises common to the rights-and-principles and law-and-economics
schools of legal theory, which together embrace most of the range of current
American theory. As I use the term, however, mainstream jurisprudence does
not include the tendencies some legal scholars call ‘experimentalist’. ‘reflex-
ive’ or ‘responsive’ law; still others call ‘new governance’, and had the term
not been lately abused, might usefully be called pragmatist.2 The Toyota
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perspective resonates with these latter tendencies. It has in some cases influ-
enced work with these tendencies, and it may prove useful in elaborating
them.
In contrast to mainstream legal thought, the Toyota system (1) emphasis-
es the goals of learning and innovation (rather than of dispute resolution and
the vindication of accepted norms); (2) combines the normative explicitness
associated with formal rules with the continuous adjustment to particulari-
ty associated with informal norms (no dialectic of rules and standards); (3)
treats normative decision making in hard cases as presumptively collective
and interdisciplinary (rather than the heroic labour of a solitary profession-
al); (4) fosters a style of reasoning that is intentionally destabilising of settled
practices (rather than harmonising or optimising); and (5) attempts to brack-
et or sublimate issues of individual and retrospective fairness or blame.
Section 1 of this chapter is a stylised account of a cluster of basic themes
in mainstream jurisprudence. Section 2 describes the contrasting themes of
Toyota jurisprudence. Section 3 shows that the Toyota themes are visible in
recent American public law developments, especially in health and safety
regulation and school reform. It also discusses proposed reforms of death
penalty administration in order to rebut the intuition that the Toyota per-
spective would be out of place in areas that are strongly charged morally.
Section 4 speculates briefly about the general direction that legal theory
would take if it absorbed the insights of the Toyota perspective. 
1. MAINSTREAM JURISPRUDENCE 
Most legal thought is committed to the following five propositions:
A. The basic functions of the legal system are dispute resolution and the vin-
dication or optimisation of accepted social values. 
In the rights-and-principles perspective, the legal system is, in HLA Hart’s
formulation, a ‘union of primary and secondary’ norms.3 The primary
norms prescribe rights, duties and powers for citizens in civil society. The
efficacy and legitimacy of these primary norms depends on their conver-
gence with informal social norms. Secondary norms allocate authority
among officials to resolve disagreement and conflict about what the pri-
mary norms should be and how they should be applied and enforced. No
matter how perfect the convergence between primary rules and informal
social norms, disputes will arise because of bad faith or the incompleteness
of social morality, and secondary norms are needed to resolve such disputes.
The secondary norms may themselves express social values such as due
process or democracy, or they may rest simply on the social interest in the
of some of the initiatives discussed here with John Dewey’s conception of democratic govern-
ment as a process of participatory learning. See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems
(Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1954 [1927]).
3 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 77, 92–93.
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resolution of conflict. Lawyers who see a broad and rich social consensus,
or who cannot imagine a legitimate legal order without one, tend to see
primary norms as fundamental. Those who focus on the fact of conflict and
disagreement about primary norms tend to emphasise secondary norms.4
In the law-and-economics perspective, the distinction between primary
and secondary norms is less central, and norms tend to merge with a broad-
er array of preferences, but the picture is similar. The legal system is sup-
posed to maximise welfare, understood in terms of current preferences. The
system is an instrument for satisfying these preferences. So the task is to
trade off the benefits of increased preference satisfaction through law mak-
ing and enforcement against the costs of these activities so as to attain the
greatest net benefit. Conflict and disagreement are treated as either costs of
enforcement or as pre-existing social harms, in either case as something to
be minimised.5
B. The dialectic of rules and standards: The legal system chooses formal
rules in order to limit discretion but at the price of reducing sensitivity to
factual particularity; it chooses informal norms (standards) to make deci-
sions sensitive to context but at the cost of reduced control of discretion.
Formal norms constrain decision more than informal ones. They limit the
range of factors that the decision maker can consider. Legal theory attrib-
utes several potential advantages to formality, but the advantage most
emphasised in general legal discourse is that formality inhibits the decision
maker’s ability to make decisions on the basis of illegitimate considera-
tions—her personal or political values and goals. The narrower and more
explicit the rule, the less room it allows for influence by personal values and
goals, and the more readily a reviewing authority can determine whether
the decision conforms to the rule.6
But of course, the more the rule constrains discretion, the more it also
inhibits consideration of how its purposes will apply in the full context of
the decision and the more often it will produce decisions at variance with
these purposes. The gap between the norm’s underlying goals and the deci-
sions it produces is directly proportional to the norm’s formality.
Lawyers generally tend to favor discretion-constraining rules for groups
they distrust and discretion-conferring standards for groups they trust,
though they do not always agree on the identity of the groups. During the
Warren Court era, liberal lawyers favoured rules for the street-level public
workforce—for example, Miranda rules for the police—and standards like
‘just cause’ for judges. More recently, conservatives who distrust the judici-
ary in criminal matters have sought to restrict their discretion through the
4 Compare Hart previous n (emphasising secondary norms) with Ronald Dworkin, Law’s
Empire (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard, 1986) 176–275 (emphasising primary norms).
5 Eg, Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th edn (New York: Aspen, 2003)
215–27, 563–65, 595–98.
6 See generally, Frederick Shauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-based Decision-making in Law and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
149–55; Posner, previous n, at 556–57.
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rules of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, with the tacit but predictable
effect of increasing the discretion of prosecutors, a group they trust, whose
charging decisions are regulated by standards.
All these lawyers, however, tend to view the choice between rules and
standards as primarily a trade-off between the costs and benefits of limiting
discretion on the one hand and of decisional contextualisation on the other.
C. Legal reasoning in hard cases is interstitial. 
It is a matter of pride in our legal tradition that the courts exercise their
law-making power ‘one case at a time’.7 They tailor their decisions to the
facts of the dispute before them. The decisions are conclusive only with
respect to those facts. Their precedential effect for other cases takes the
form of ‘gravitational force’ proportional to the proximity of their facts to
the ones in the decided case.8
Hard cases are those for which no statute or past case plainly dictates an
answer. We resolve hard cases by deriving results that harmonise with sur-
rounding authority. We accept as presumptively valid the clear answers the
authority gives for other cases and try to derive principles from them that
are consistent with each and indicate how the case at hand should be
resolved. A good answer is one that fits with the surrounding authority. 
Ronald Dworkin’s rights-and-principles account portrays ‘fit’ or
‘integrity’ as a virtue in itself. However, there are two other rationales for
interstitial decision making that are widely accepted within both the
rights-and-principles and law-and-economics perspective. The first
emphasises the limited capacities and democratic legitimacy of courts. We
need courts to resolve disputes, but their ability and authority to promul-
gate rules that go beyond the specifics of these cases is controversial. The
second emphasises the importance of predictability. Both fairness and effi-
ciency are served when citizens can predict when the state will intervene in
private affairs. Such predictability allows successful planning of individual
activity and successful coordination of joint activity. In this view, the law
strives to eliminate the friction of individual interaction. This goal is served
when courts respect settled precedent and innovate only when necessary
(either because the law ‘runs out’ or because social change has rendered set-
tled precedent intolerable).9
D. The core form of legal decision making is strongly differentiated from
other roles and activities. 
Legal theory has been most preoccupied with explaining a single phenome-
non—how the judge pulls the rabbit of determinate resolution out of the hat
of ambiguous authority. It treats other types of legal work as peripheral,
40 William H Simon
7 Eg, Cass Sunstein, Once Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2001).
8 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1978) 111; see also
Dworkin, n 4 above, at 250–54 (on the principle of ‘local priority’ in the assessment of precedent).
9 Posner, n 5 above, at 560–61.
Ch 02.qxd  3/15/2006  6:52 PM  Page 40
and it treats the judge’s work as distinct from and independent of that of
other actors even within the court system. 
The rights-and-principles tradition argues that judicial decision making is
strongly differentiated methodologically from other forms of public deci-
sion making. To a unique extent, judges must reason prescriptively from
authority, rather than instrumentally with reference to goals. And the
judge’s isolation from other officials and her relative lack of accountability
for the practical effects of her decisions are sometimes praised as a key ele-
ments of the judicial ‘independence’ that is a key feature of the rule of law.
For other theorists, the tendency to treat the judge’s role in institutional
isolation is more a tacit, or even regretted, habit than a matter of principle,
but the habit is pervasive and longstanding. Legal theory takes little
account, even within the legal system, of anyone but judges, even though
we know that the practical effects of judicial intervention depend on clerks,
probation officers, special masters, bailiffs, sheriffs, marshals, trustees,
executors and receivers. The theorists’ interest in the practices of courts typ-
ically stops at the point of judicial decision. Whether and how the decision
is enforced or its broader practical impact is a matter of secondary, if any,
concern. Judicial decisions are often appraised in terms of their internal
plausibility, rather than in terms of their practical contribution to realising
their goals.10
It is often pointed out that this focus on the judicial decision is parochial
and anachronistic. Even within the court system, judicial activity is increas-
ingly described as ‘managerial’, especially in connection with two kinds of
cases. First, there are institutional reform cases in which the courts under-
take to reform the administrative structures and practices of public institu-
tions like schools and prisons that have failed to discharge their duties.
Second, there are cases like those involving small drug crimes or child wel-
fare—small cases that occur in large numbers with common patterns in
which the court is expected to intervene in a fairly complex long-term man-
ner in the hope of improving the welfare of some of the parties. Although
these developments are widely recognised, they have not much affected the
preoccupations of legal theory.11
E. Legal decision making is paradigmatically retrospective and individualist.
Fairness is a central preoccupation of American common law decision mak-
ing. Fairness means basically corrective justice. It is centrally concerned with
Toyota Jurisprudence 41
10 There is, of course, a substantial empirical and instrumental literature on the effects of
legal rules and judicial decisions. Much of this literature is theoretical and might well be called
‘legal theory’. However, I exclude it from the definition of ‘mainstream legal theory’ because
it is more peripheral to the legal culture than the judge-focused rights-and-principles and law-
and-economics literature and has had limited influence on them.
11 See Judith Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374; Michael C
Dorf and Charles F Sabel, ‘Drug Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government’ (2000)
53 Vanderbilt Law Review 831.
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the allocation of benefits and burdens among individuals, and with linking
present treatment to past conduct. The American legal system stands ready
to commit vast resources to the determination and evaluation of past con-
duct in order to calibrate present reward or punishment to it. The concern
with fairness is longstanding, but it has recently intensified because of the
increased punitiveness of the legal system in both its civil and criminal
spheres. Punishment is usually predicated at least in part on retrospective
fairness values, and it triggers demands for more elaborate efforts to make
the relevant determinations.
Fairness is the fundamental normative commitment of the rights-and-
principles school. These theorists are prone to defend fairness values as
more fundamental than others or to suggest that they are more strongly
suited to vindication by judges.12 Law-and-economics is different on this
point. It rejects fairness in favour of welfare as a normative touchstone. Yet,
despite this distinction, law-and-economics also focuses on crafting legal
rules that apportion current reward and sanctions to past individual con-
duct.13 Sometimes fairness values re-enter in the form of preferences, which
then become part of the welfare function to be optimised. Sometimes the
results dictated by corrective justice norms turn out to be the best means of
regulating behaviour in ways desirable on welfare grounds. Even when its
prescriptions depart from the rights-and-principles view, law-and-econom-
ics most often proceeds from an individualist and retrospective approach. It
seeks to craft incentives that induce individual, presumptively rational,
actors to behave efficiently. And it accepts the common law premise that
future behaviour is effectively regulated through the design of sanctions to
fit past conduct in current cases.
Two problems in contemporary legal systems challenge the idea of retro-
spective individual liability in either the direct fairness or efficiency perspec-
tives. The first is that much conflict arises as a by-product of conduct that
is generally socially valuable. The paradigmatic traditional cases of individ-
ual retrospective liability involve intentional instances of generally noxious
behaviour, say, battery or theft. But a very large class of contemporary
cases—including unintentional torts and many violations of business regu-
lation—involve conduct that is in general beneficial but that has been car-
ried too far or conducted with insufficient precautions, often inadvertently.
Legal theory has wrestled with the question of when such conduct should
be regarded as blameworthy or inefficient. A key touchstone has been the
idea of negligence or reasonableness. The meaning of the reasonableness
norm is contested. One ambiguity refers to the relation between customary
practice on the one hand and optimal practice on the other. Sometimes
42 William H Simon
12 Dworkin, n 8 above.
13 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Efficiency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard,
2002) 134–48.
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reasonableness means the dominant practice among similar actors.
Sometimes it means something more. But in either case, the inquiry in main-
stream legal thought remains retrospective and individual. It is the prevalent
or optimal practice at the time of the episode that counts, and whatever stan-
dard we come up with must have been within the capacity of the defendant
at the time.14
Yet, it is often debatable whether either fairness or efficiency warrants lia-
bility based on such a retrospective inquiry. To many, fairness values do not
warrant sanctions for a broad range of harms arising from unforeseen con-
sequences of generally beneficial conduct that are nevertheless swept into
our liability system. Others suggest that imposing liability may be inefficient
because material compensation does not effectively redress symbolic or emo-
tional injuries, or because the liability process does not directly induce
improvements in the systemic practices that produce harm, and, to the
extent that it causes actors to hide information, may inhibit improvement.15
A second problem arises from the fact that the defendants in a large frac-
tion of legal controversies are organisations. It is often not clear how either
fairness or efficiency dictates the imposition of liability on organisations.
One strategy is to ignore or pierce the organisation and impose liability on
its individual constituents when their conduct would independently warrant
it. Another is to treat the organisation as if it were an individual when the
elements of liability can be established on the basis of the aggregate conduct
of multiple constituents acting for the organisation. Neither strategy is
entirely satisfactory. With the first, decision making remains plausibly indi-
vidualistic but at the cost of ignoring the distinctive dangers and problems
of collective activities. With the second, the individualism seems strained.
For example, while the criminal punishment of corporations does not strike
most people as per se unjust, it is very hard to explain in terms of individ-
ualist fairness notions when, for example, the main effect falls on current
employees and shareholders who neither encouraged nor benefited from the
wrongdoing.
Moreover, while law-and-economics scholarship often treats the incen-
tive effects of liability on organisations as tantamount to the effects on indi-
viduals, this is usually a matter of faith more than logic or evidence.
Economics presupposes individual decision makers, and corporations are
complex aggregations of individuals. Nevertheless, the practice of either
ignoring organisations or pretending that they are individuals has long been
favoured by the legal culture as a way of reconciling its individualistic doc-
trines with the reality of a world of organisations.
Toyota Jurisprudence 43
14 Henry M Hart, Jr, and Albert M Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law (William N Eskridge, Jr, and Philip P Frickey (eds)) (Mineola, NY:
Foundation Press, 1994) 403–49.
15 See, eg, Braithwaite, n 2 above.
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2. THE TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
AS A JURISPRUDENTIAL PHENOMENON
TPS arises from dissatisfaction with a traditional mass manufacturing
model that combines central planning with ad hoc shop floor adjustment.16
In the traditional model, a central corps of managers and engineers prom-
ulgates rules that dictate practice to a workforce that is narrowly skilled
and divided among functional departments (for example, milling, painting,
cutting, polishing, assembly). Central management forecasts sales and then
prescribes production targets for specific products, orders materials, and
schedules each phase of the production process. Typically, the plan calls for
the parts of a product to be processed separately in different departments in
large batches with specialised machinery.
Invariably, adjustments are required as events depart from the plan. The
pattern of orders is different from the forecast. Supplies fail to arrive on
time, or they are defective. In the plant, machines break down, or parts are
improperly machined. The plan contemplates a series of adjustment mech-
anisms for such contingencies. ‘Expediters’ may travel between the sales
department and the factory floor to advance orders ahead in the production
queue in accordance with the needs and clout of the customer. The plant
can maintain a central parts inventory, or each worker can have a ‘buffer’
stock of spare parts at her station in case new parts fail to arrive on time or
in proper condition. A specialised inspectorate or Quality Control depart-
ment can review finished product and send non-conforming items back or
to a special department for re-work.
TPS proponents complain that such a system is slow in responding to
unanticipated changes in the volume of customer demand or in its capacity
to modify or change products. It takes a long time for centralised manage-
ment to absorb information indicating that changes are needed, and a long
time for it to develop and implement needed changes. The traditional sys-
tem tends to be quite wasteful of labour and materials, in part, because it is
slow to discover defects and, when they are discovered, slow to remedy
them. In addition, the system does not effectively capitalise on the knowl-
edge and potential creative effort of most its workers. And by encouraging
tolerance for errors and the expectation that they will be remedied down-
stream, the system fails to cultivate in workers a sense of responsibility or
‘ownership’.
TPS tries to reduce reliance on forecasting, first, by configuring its
sales efforts to smooth out orders, and second, by making the manufac-
turing process more flexible and quick. Production cues are transmitted
44 William H Simon
16 For general accounts, see Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large Scale
Production (Portland, OR: Productivity Press, 1988); Shigeo Shingo, Study of Toyota
Production System from an Industrial Engineering Point of View (Portland, OR: Productivity
Press, 1981); James P Womack, Daniel T Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine that Changed
the World: The Story of Lean Production (New York: Macmillan, 1990).
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less hierarchically through central planners and more laterally through the
shop floor. This is accomplished in part by the kanban system in which
downstream stations signal their need for parts by returning cards upstream.
Parts and products tend to be produced in smaller lots in a more continuous
process with more broadly skilled workers and less specialised machinery.
The traditional model strongly differentiates between conception, which
is the responsibility of central management, and execution on the shop
floor. TPS attenuates this distinction. The phrase kaizen, or continuous
improvement, connotes that process be revised in the course of its execu-
tion. TPS diffuses responsibility for the organisation of production broadly.
Shop floor teams write and revise the descriptions for their jobs, schedule
their members, and arrange for maintenance and repair of their equipment.
Some workers meet regularly in ‘quality circles’ to consider problems and
propose solutions. All workers are encouraged to make suggestions for
improvements in the process, and such suggestions often result in changes.
Inspection and quality control cease to be the exclusive preoccupation of an
elite corps and become the responsibility of the entire workforce. While the
old system tolerated a significant number of defects and expected many
items to be re-worked, TPS espouses ‘zero tolerance’ for defects and has no
re-work department.
The kaizen idea and the ‘zero tolerance’ norm dictate a distinctive
response to production problems. A problem occurs when a defective part
appears, or when a worker is unable to perform a prescribed action (say,
because there is insufficient time), or when performing the prescribed action
would be inconsistent with quality norms (for example, painting over dirt).
The system discourages ad hoc adjustments to such problems. It does not
permit workers to pass defective parts down the line, and it does not provide
buffer inventory to substitute for defective parts. Instead, such problems are
treated as symptoms of structural flaws to be remedied immediately. If nec-
essary, this means stopping the line entirely until the problem is fixed. Shop
floor workers have the power and duty to pull the ‘andon cord’ that brings
production to a halt and illuminates an electronic display that signals to the
entire plant that a problem has occurred. In principle, production resumes
only when the process has been revised sufficiently to eliminate the danger
of recurrence. The procedure through which the solution is devised is one
of consensual deliberation by representatives of any group likely to have
relevant knowledge or whose cooperation is likely to be necessary to imple-
menting the solution.
If we consider TPS as a legal system, the following points emerge:
A. Learning and innovation are key purposes of the system. 
The purposes of TPS are not adequately accounted for by the preoccupa-
tions of mainstream legal theory. TPS has primary norms that reflect a pre-
existing consensus about legitimate behaviour—rules that prohibit assault
and theft, for example. It also has secondary norms that constitute hierarchi-
cal procedures of coercive dispute resolution. Neither kind of rule, however,
Toyota Jurisprudence 45
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plays a salient role in a successful plant, and neither is directly associated with
what the participants consider the most important and distinctive functions
of TPS.
From the participants’ point of view, the key norms are those that consti-
tute the problem-solving process. This process is not concerned with dis-
pute resolution. It starts out with a shared sense among the participants that
something is wrong and a shared sense of common goals. What requires
discussion is not disagreement, but uncertainty. Moreover, neither the com-
position nor the operation of the problem-solving groups is determined by
norms about authority.17 Composition is determined by the principle that
‘anyone with relevant knowledge of a problem is included, regardless of
rank’.18 Process is a matter of consensus, not a search for a pre-existing con-
sensus, but an effort to forge a new one.
The problem-solving discussions do take place against a background of
general values of ‘quality’. But it would be misleading to see the discussions
as efforts to vindicate or maximise these values. The values are indeterminate.
The discussions are as much efforts to define them as to implement them.
For example, although early TPS proponents sometimes equated ‘quali-
ty’ with cost minimisation, the more recent literature speaks with contempt
of ‘cost-based strategies’.19 The change apparently reflects the experience
that American managers applying cost minimisation rigorously have tend-
ed to reject Toyota-style practices. They found that the Toyota approach
tended to raise the costs that can most readily be measured—short-term
direct labour costs—and to create benefits that are speculative (savings
from future innovation) or hard to measure in advance (enhanced customer
satisfaction and market share). 
Similarly, ‘quality’ strategies like TPS are considered antithetical to man-
agerial strategies preoccupied with stock price maximisation. Whether or
not stock price maximisation is plausible goal, the strategy suffers from
indeterminacy; the goal does not translate clearly into more concrete direc-
tives. In practice, it is associated with a focus on financial indicators, but
46 William H Simon
17
While lower levels [in TPS] did not have much authority to make decisions without prior
consultation with superiors, this apparent centralization usually took the form of ‘fact-
based’ dialogue based on expertise rather than command-and-control domination based on
positional authority....Japanese organizations had more de jure centralization but also
more de facto participation than comparable American organizations.
Paul Adler, ‘Flexibility versus Efficiency: A Case Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota
Production System’ (1999) 10 Organization Science 43 at 54.
18 John Paul MacDuffie, ‘The Road to Root Cause: Problem-Solving at Three Auto-
Assembly Plants’ (1997) 43 Management Science 479 at 495. My description of TPS is based
largely on the espoused principles of its proponents. Studies such as MacDuffie’s and Adler’s,
previous n, indicate that some plants conform extensively to these principles but also that there
is a good deal of variation in practice among plants that purport to have absorbed them.
19 Cf. Ohno, n 16 above, at 8–9, 52–56 (discussing cost minimisation as fundamental goal
of the system) with Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing (Portland, OR: Productivity
Press, 1998) 54–56, 76–78 (disparaging ‘cost-based organization’).
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the stock price performance of the firms that have taken this tack has not
been superior. Paradoxically, it appears that the managers most devoted to
pleasing the stock market are not the ones who end up doing so, at least in
the long run.20
A more popular definition of quality associates it with customer satisfac-
tion. But what products and product features customers value and how cus-
tomers trade off performance and price are matters that are not fully known
in advance. They are discovered in the process itself.
The quality norm is thus not a consensus to be vindicated or a value to
be maximised. It is both a bet and a cultural commitment: a bet that short-
term process investments will lead to discoveries that will shift cost curves;
a cultural commitment that unifies and motivates the disparate groups in
the production process by giving creativity and social dignity to their work. 
The dimension of TPS omitted in mainstream jurisprudence is the focus
on learning and innovation. TPS is, most distinctively, an effort to discover
new ways of producing. The diffusion of responsibility and the stressing of
the system to induce constant collaborative revision force pooling of knowl-
edge in ways intended to generate new understanding. 
B. TPS combines a strong commitment to formalisation of norms with con-
tinuous adjustment to unanticipated particularity.
TPS norms are always as articulated as possible, but they are not applied
consciously in a way that would frustrate their purposes. Instead, the rules
get re-considered and re-written when they come in tension with unantici-
pated contingency. The workers’ power/duty to pull the andon cord and
stop production represents the authority to trigger a legislative deliberation
on the amendment of the rule.
The purpose of formality in TPS is quite different from its primary pur-
pose in mainstream legal thought. Toyota formality is not designed to
restrict discretion. TPS is a high-trust system with broadly educated work-
ers who have a strong general stake in their jobs and are subject to constant
peer pressure to perform well. Rather, the purpose of formal norms is to
facilitate learning, or as Michel Greif puts it, ‘to inspire improvements’.21
‘Say what you do, and do what you say’ is a basic premise of Toyota-style
engineering.22 As it rejects the command-and-control model of Fordist
bureaucracy, TPS rejects the traditional artisanal vision in which work is
Toyota Jurisprudence 47
20 James Belohlav, ‘Quality, Strategy, and Competitiveness’ (1993) 32 California Management
Review 55 at 56–61. See also Masaahi Imai, Kaizen: The Key to Japan’s Competitive Success
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1986) 49–50:
Japanese managers have found that seeking improvement for improvement’s sake is the
surest way to strengthen the company’s overall competitiveness. If you take care of quali-
ty, the profits will take care of themselves. 
21 Michel Greif, The Visual Factory: Building Participation Through Shared Information 74
(Portland, OR: Productivity Press, 1991).
22 Joseph Casio, (ed) The ISO 14000 Handbook (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: American Society
for Quality, 1996) 196.
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regulated by tacit norms that can be grasped only by prolonged socialisation
into guild and local workplace cultures. The duty to articulate forces the
actors to reflect on what they are proposing to do and to communicate it as
precisely as possible to their peers. Codifying the practice means that it can
be more readily learned by people who did not participate in its formula-
tion, or who do not share background experiences with the authors. The
more explicitly defined the job, the broader the range of workers who can
perform it. Thus it becomes easier to redeploy workers in accordance with
their availability. It also increases the range of perspectives that can be
brought to bear on the norm’s revision. An articulated norm is more readi-
ly criticised and debated both because and it is more easily grasped and
because criticism is less likely to risk personal offence when the norm is
divorced from particular people.23
Formalisation is thus strongly associated with revisability. In TPS, a rule
is simultaneously ‘a point to adhere to and a point of departure’.24
C. Decision making is fundamentally collaborative and interdisciplinary.
TPS, as we have seen, precludes the individual discretionary decision mak-
ing involved in ad hoc adjustment to unanticipated particularity. On the
other hand, it depends heavily on a different kind of judgment to revise con-
tinuously its rules and practices. This judgment is typically collective and
interdisciplinary.
In traditional manufacturing, the process is often organised functionally,
with each group or department focused on a particular activity, such as
painting or machining or assembly. In TPS, production is organised more in
terms of types of products, with each group performing a series of func-
tions, and perhaps producing entire products, with a range of skills. Work
is conducted by teams whose members are broadly trained and who make
decisions collectively about job design, scheduling, and materials require-
ments. In traditional manufacturing, major unexpected problems are often
handled exclusively by corps of specialists trained in a particular discipline,
such as electricians or machinists. In TPS, when major problems arise, they
are addressed by groups broadly representative of affected constituencies
throughout the plant. These may include various shop floor teams, supervi-
sors, suppliers, marketing people and designers.
Collaborative decision making responds to two constraints. First, the dis-
persal of information throughout the production process. No individual
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23 See Imai, n 20 above, at 74–78; Greif, n 21 above, at 74–76.
24 Ibid at 75. See also, Paul Adler, ‘Time and Motion Regained’ (1993) Harvard Business
Review 97 at 104,
[W]orkers create a consensual standard that they teach to the system by writing job
descriptions. The system then teaches these standards back to workers, who, then, by fur-
ther analysis, consultation, and consensus, make additional improvements. Continual reit-
eration of this disciplined process of analysis, standardization, re-analysis, refinement, and
restandardization creates an intensely structured system of continuous improvement.
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knows enough to make key problem-solving decisions and no fixed man-
agement group could be relied on to know enough to solve all problems.
Second, the need for multiple perspectives. Many problems call for multi-
ple kinds of technical knowledge or for kinds of technical knowledge that
cannot be identified at the outset. Dirt on a component might be a machin-
ing issue (if it can be eliminated in the course of machining) or a painting
issue (if it can be painted over so as to make it unnoticeable) or a market-
ing issue (if the customer will not care about it). Team decision making
increases the range of both information and technical perspectives that are
considered in making the decision.
D. Decision making in TPS is intentionally destabilising. 
John Womack and Daniel Jones contrast TPS with ‘steady state’ manage-
ment.25 In the latter, the goal is to minimise disruption and, when disrup-
tion is unavoidable, restore equilibrium as quickly as possible. By contrast,
TPS involves deliberate destabilisation.26 It induces problems with highly
specified rules, unforgiving quality standards, minute synchronisation, and
minimisation of inventory.
Two practices associated with TPS are relevant here. The first is bench-
marking—self-assessment in terms of the performances of industry leaders.
Benchmarking subjects every practice and product to comparison with the
firm’s most successful competitors. This approach represents a shift from
the traditional practice of comparing performance to industry averages—
the in-house analogue to the common law reasonableness norm.
Reasonableness connotes that typical performance should be maintained in
steady state. But benchmarking connotes that only superior performance is
adequate. Anything less requires efforts to improve, and in a competitive
market, even superior performance is unlikely to be maintained without
efforts to improve. Thus, the lean production literature is full of statements
disparaging adherence to custom or reasonableness. For example, Womack
and Jones write:
[T]he high achievers set specific timetables to accomplish seemingly impossible
tasks and then routinely meet or exceed them. The low achievers, by contrast, ask
what would be reasonable for their current organization ... to accomplish, and
generally defeat themselves before they set out.27
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25 James P Womack and Daniel T Jones, Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in
Your Corporation, rev edn (New York: Free Press, 2003).
26 This is not to say that TPS plants are less stable, merely that an important degree of insta-
bility is deliberate. Disruption is typically experienced as frequent when TPS methods are inau-
gurated but declines when they are successful:
Today, in Toyota plants, where every worker can stop the line, yields approach 100 per-
cent. That is, the line practically never stops! (In mass-production plants by contrast, where
no one but the line manager can stop the line, the line stops constantly ... to deal with mate-
rial supply and coordination problems.) Womack, Jones and Roos, n16 above, at 57.
27 Womack and Jones, n 25 above, at 95.
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As a descriptive matter, such rhetoric needs to be discounted for hyperbole.
However, the rejection of the goal of equilibrium and the commitment to
continuous destabilisation it implies is a critical characteristic of the TPS
strategy.
The other practice associated with destabilisation is ‘root cause analysis’.
Problems are supposed to be traced backward through the production
process. The rule-of-thumb prescribes tracing back five stages—the ‘Five
Whys’.28 This means that both inquiry and solution potentially ramify
beyond the point at which the problem arose. For example:
Why is machine A broken? Because no preventive maintenance was per-
formed.
Why was the maintenance crew derelict? Because it is always repairing
machine B.
Why is machine B always broken? Because the part it machines always
jams.
Why does the jam recur? Because the part is warped by heat stress.
Why does the part overheat? A design flaw.29
The point is that the solution to the problem may require unsettling prac-
tice at a point remote from the one at which it was identified. In the short
term, this approach is often more disruptive and costly than narrower
responses. John Paul MacDuffie illustrates this in a comparative study of
American auto plants. He treats as evidence of scant progress in implement-
ing lean production at a General Motors plant that a quality auditor’s
response to a paint defect was limited to ‘charg[ing] the costs’ of the defect
to an earlier inspection team that should have discovered it.30 This limited
response violates the spirit of TPS. It does not inquire into the remote cause
of the problem, or even of the inspectors’ failure. It relies on indirect induce-
ments to improve performance—penalties to inspectors—that, if they have
any effect at all, are likely to cause low-visibility ad hoc adjustments, rather
than explicit systemic revision.
The problem-solving process associated with root cause analysis is incre-
mental in the sense that it begins with dissatisfaction with only a small part
of the process and ends with a revision of only a small part. But it is not
interstitial in the common law sense of ‘one case at a time’. With root case
analysis, the initial definition of the problem does not control its analysis
or disposition. Every problem potentially implicates any of the parts of the
system. 
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28 Ohno, n 16 above, at 17–18.
29 The phrase ‘root cause analysis’ is a little misleading to the extent that it implies that we
are interested in a historical or scientific account of how the error happened. The search is, not
so much for a retrospective description, as for opportunities for improvement. The ‘five’, of
course, is a crude rule of thumb. Its blatant arbitrariness is an acknowledgment that the search
for cause is potentially infinite. 
30 MacDuffie, n 18 above, at 486.
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This insistence that intelligent implementation of the parts of the system
requires an understanding of how each part fits into the whole is reflected
in the broad training workers receive and in plant design for transparency.
Plants are laid out simply and logically. Clutter and visual obstructions are
minimised. Elaborate displays visible from all points in the plant summarise
what is happening at each station. When a problem that requires suspen-
sion of production occurs, its nature and location are communicated imme-
diately to the entire plant. The premise is that, at the outset, we cannot say
which people in the plant will have the knowledge and skills necessary to
the solution.31
The Toyota perspective thus resonates with a point Dworkin makes
against Cass Sunstein’s defense of the ‘one case at a time’ approach to adju-
dication.32 Sunstein argues that judges do better to resolve cases in terms of
relatively narrow, low-level principles. Relatively high-level principles
should be disfavoured because they have implications that extend broadly
across the legal system, and thus require more complex decision making,
have greater potential to produce disagreement, and are more likely to
upset settled expectations. Dworkin replies that we expect judges to justify
their decisions in terms of principle, and there is no reason to think that the
principles that provide the best justifications for decisions will be consis-
tently of limited generality. What Dworkin calls ‘justificatory ascent’ means
that particular claims of right potentially implicate broader structures in a
way analogous to the ramifying tendency of Toyota production problems. 
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31 The Toyota perspective challenges divisions, not only between work roles and groups
within the firm, but also the boundaries between firms. The challenge of continuous improve-
ment is applied to the entire process of producing a given product or product family. Just-in-
time delivery of components requires close coordination with suppliers. The upstream ‘root
cause’ of a problem may often lie beyond the boundaries of the firm. The current inter-firm
divisions are provisional, and since firm boundaries tend to obscure information, suspect.
Thus, the Toyota approach prescribes close collaboration and free information-sharing
between firms at different stages of the production process. It urges process designers to envi-
sion and perfect the entire ‘value stream’ without regard to how it is currently partitioned:
For example, when Pratt & Whitney, the world’s largest manufacturer of aircraft jet
engines, recently started to map its value streams for its families of jet engines, it discov-
ered that activities undertaken by its raw materials suppliers to produce ultrapure metals
were duplicated at great cost by the next firms down stream, the forgers who converted
metal ingots into near-net shapes suitable for machining. At the same time, the initial ingot
of material—for example, titanium or nickel—was ten times the weight of the machined
parts eventually fashioned from it. Ninety percent of the very expensive metals were being
scrapped because the initial ingot was poured in such a massive size—the melters were cer-
tain that this was efficient—without much attention to the shape of the finished parts. And
finally, the melters were preparing several different ingots—at great cost—in order to meet
Pratt’s precise technical requirements for each engine, which varied marginally from those
of other engine families and from the needs of competitors. Many of these activities could
be eliminated almost immediately with dramatic cost savings. (Womack and Jones, n 25
above, at 20).
32 Ronald Dworkin, ‘In Praise of Theory’ (1997) 29 Arizona State Law Journal 353 at
368–75.
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But the analogy ends when Dworkin describes the goal of decision mak-
ing as establishing harmony within an existing body of norms. In TPS, legit-
imacy does not depend on connecting decisions to established authority. (To
be sure, there will usually be some such connection, but not because legiti-
macy requires it; rather because, as Stanley Fish emphasises, the decision
makers cannot escape the influence and constraints of their cultural and
practical circumstances.)33 In TPS, legitimacy arises from the provisional
consensus of the stakeholders and their commitment to re-assess readily in
accordance with agreed-on criteria.
Another destabilising aspect of Toyota-style decision making arises
from the interaction of its prescriptive and instrumental aspects. Rights-
and-principles reasoning is prescriptive; it is concerned with elaborating
goals—values with intrinsic worth. From its perspective, implementation is
secondary. Law-and-economics reasoning is instrumental; it focuses on
means and implementation. It usually treats the goals it seeks to further as
given and fixed. In contrast, reasoning in the Toyota system encourages the
re-assessment of ends in the process of implementing them. Discussion
starts out as instrumental to, inter alia, defined goals of product quality, but
these goals can be reconsidered in the course of problem-solving. In tradi-
tional plants that have experimented with shop floor teams and quality cir-
cles, discussion stops when it reaches ‘design issues’34 But in plants that
have gone farther, design engineers may be dispatched from headquarters
and assigned to work with teams in the plants. Thus, the difference between
production (means) and design (goals) is eroded. Decision making in man-
ufacturing is potentially destabilising, not only of spatially remote features
of the production process, but of settled expectations about the goals of the
process.
The interaction of prescriptive and instrumental thought is also salient
when new products are being designed. The traditional process is a sequen-
tial and departmentalised one in which the marketing people specify cus-
tomer preferences; design engineers devise specifications; process engineers
translate the specification into manufacturing plans; plant engineers config-
ure machinery and work practices to the manufacturing plans; and once
production starts, line workers execute the plant engineers’ instructions. By
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33 Stanley Fish, ‘Still Wrong After All These Years’ in Doing What Comes Naturally
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 356–71. As Holmes put it, ‘historic
continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity’. Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘Learning
and Science’ in Collected Papers (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1920) 13839.
34
For example, the plant has had a persistent problem with a bracket on the brake pedal sub-
assembly to which the cables for both the cruise control and power brakes are attached.
The bracket often moves when the cruise control is used, resulting in misadjustment of the
breaks. [T]he problem was a poor design—that the cruise control and brake cables should-
n’t be attached to the same bracket, and that the bracket was in a bad location. [But to add
or reposition a bracket would require] a long struggle with Detroit. (MacDuffie, n 18
above, at 484).
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contrast, the Toyota style is concurrent. Teams with members drawn from
all these fields work together to consider simultaneously customer needs,
cost, technical performance and manufacturability. As the time for manu-
facture approaches, ‘pilot teams’ are recruited from the shop floor to work
on the specification of jobs for manufacture of the new models, and they
sometimes make suggestions that result in design revision. Pilot versions of
the new models are sometimes built on assembly lines that are concurrent-
ly building the old models in order to facilitate a quick transition.35
In all these ways, TPS blurs the distinction between the prescriptive and
the instrumental, or the elaboration of goals and the specification of means.
E. Individualistic and retrospective concerns are sublimated or bracketed.
TPS is intensely preoccupied with mistakes, but its orientation toward them
is prospective and collective. The issue is how the group will fix the prob-
lem. In his study of three auto plants, MacDuffie found the two American-
owned ones preoccupied with determining who should be held responsible
for mistakes. By contrast, at the Honda plant which had more fully
embraced TPS, ‘[t]he accounting system is deliberately designed to minimise
the time spent figuring out who’s to blame’.36
In the TPS perspective, problems are more likely to result from defects in
system design than from blameworthy deviance on the part of particular
workers. Assigning responsibility consumes unproductive time and effort
and encourages recrimination that undermines solidarity and willingness to
volunteer information about mistakes. TPS thus presumes that ‘a problem
with our product is a problem for the whole company, not an individual or
department’.37
The difference between ‘root cause analysis’ and typical common law lia-
bility analysis is revealing. The latter stops when it finds blameworthiness,
and it usually measures blameworthiness by departure from established
norms. On the other hand, root cause analysis is primarily concerned with
how the norms could be improved. Moreover, when root cause analysis dis-
covers violations of established norms, it does not stop. It goes on to consid-
er whether the violations are symptomatic of some background condition
that might be improved. Operator negligence, for example, might be a
symptom of deficient training, or workplace distractions, or excessively
long shifts. (A common law court might go on the consider these systemic
factors if the plaintiff could make a case that they departed from established
norms, but whether it did so would depend on the plaintiff’s individual
concerns, such as whether institutional liability would be necessary in order
for a judgment to be collectable, rather than the potential benefits to the
system.)
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35 Womack, Jones, and Roos, n 16 above, at 138–68; Adler, ‘Flexibility vs. Efficiency’ n 17
above.
36 Ibid at 493. 
37 Ibid.
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The TPS system emphasises intangible incentives, such as peer respect,
over material ones, and group incentives over individual ones. Contingent
compensation is often on a company, plant, or group basis, and rarely on
an individual one.
Nevertheless, we’ve seen that TPS is nested in larger structures that con-
tain norms that more approximate the themes of mainstream jurisprudence.
I noted above that there are background clusters of secondary norms that
allocate dispute resolution authority. There are also background clusters
that are responsive to concerns about individual fairness and incentives.
Three are especially notable.38
First, in Japanese firms, TPS is typically accompanied by a parallel per-
sonnel system that operates in critical respects more hierarchically and
informally than the production system. This system provides for the rank-
ing of employees, mostly by seniority but also on the basis of informal
supervisorial assessments of performance. This ranking has a small influ-
ence on compensation and a larger one on promotions. Supervisorial judg-
ment is checked both by administrative review and by the possibility of
challenge through a union grievance process. In some companies, employ-
ees dissatisfied with their supervisors can easily transfer to a different unit.
Second, adoption of TPS typically correlates with a relatively high degree
of employment security, and TPS proponents often insist that the latter is a
condition of the former. Workers are likely to be more cooperative when
productivity increases do not threaten their jobs and when their pay and
security do not depend on their particular position in the company. Job
security encourages long-term identification with the company, which in
turns encourages voluntary effort. 
Third, worker and employer in the Toyota-style firm typically bind them-
selves to each other through reciprocal investments. The firm invests in the
worker by providing the more extensive training in general-purpose skills
that TPS requires relative to traditional manufacturing. The worker invests
in the firm by accepting back-loaded, seniority-based compensation. Each
has an incentive to satisfy the other and preserve the relation.
Thus, individual fairness and incentive issues have not been ignored in
TPS. However, their salience has been reduced through bracketing, muting
and deferral. Fairness issues are bracketed simply by removing them from
the shop floor to a separate department with separate personnel. They are
muted by the bonding practices that mean that the stakes in any individual
claim arising from conduct in the production process will often be dwarfed
by the shared interest in preserving the relationship. And they are deferred
by a system that provides rewards for success. To be sure, fairness issues can
potentially arise over the division of the fruits of success. But it is a com-
mon experience that collaborators find it easier to allocate the benefits of
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38 See generally Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 49–98.
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success than the burdens of failure. By promising contingent group compen-
sation, the system may reduce individual fairness claims by deferring some
of the potential for them to a future point where, if success has occurred,
the pressure to press them will have relaxed.
The bracketing, muting and deferral of individual incentive and fairness
issues make Toyota Jurisprudence better able than its mainstream counter-
part to address organisational actors. The basic units of Toyota
Jurisprudence are groups rather than individuals. The groups, however,
have fluid identities that are reconstituted continuously in the problem-solv-
ing process. Problem-solving groups may cross departmental divisions and
even legal boundaries between firms. The participants are motivated by col-
lective incentives, both material and immaterial ones, such as solidarity and
craft pride. A system of rewards and sanctions calibrated to individual per-
formance would generate centrifugal pressures that would fragment groups.
Even a retrospective system preoccupied with past group performance
would be disruptive because it could not take account of the fluid re-com-
position of groups; the groups currently being rewarded or sanctioned
might not have the same composition as they did at the time of the relevant
past conduct. On the other hand, the focus on collective goals and incen-
tives makes it possible for Toyota Jurisprudence to treat groups as central.
3. TOYOTA JURISPRUDENCE AND PUBLIC LAW INNOVATION
The Toyota perspective resonates with some important recent trends in
American public law that my Columbia colleagues call ‘experimentalist’
and that Carey Coglianese and David Lazar call ‘management-based regu-
lation’.39 The trends are evident in several areas of health and safety regu-
lation. They are also prominent in the approach to school reform partially
codified in the No Child Left Behind Act. 
Health-and-safety programmes that exemplify these tendencies include
the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) food safety pro-
gramme of the Department of Agriculture, the Process Safety Management
Program for hazardous substances of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the safety regime for nuclear power plants over-
seen by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Institute of Nuclear
Plant Operations (INPO), and the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act
(TURA).40
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39 Dorf and Sabel, n 2 above; Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-Based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37 Law and
Society Review 601.
40 See Coglianese and Lazer, previous n, at 696–700 (HAACP and Process Safety); Bradley C
Karkkainen, ‘Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 257, 354–56 (TURA);
Joseph Rees, Hostages to Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile
Island (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) (NRC and INPO).
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These regimes proceed by requiring regulated actors to identify hazards
of particular kinds and to formulate their own plans for dealing with them.
The plans must be based on research (not necessarily the actor’s own) show-
ing the efficacy of the measures prescribed. The plans must be periodically
reviewed and revised in the light of experience. They must specify toler-
ances and indicators to define satisfactory performance and corrective
measures when the performance is unsatisfactory. Actors are audited for the
adequacy of their plans and for compliance with them. The regimes (or
related programmes) specify mandatory practice or performance standards,
but the actor will also be held to the standards its own plans provide, which
are expected to be higher than the mandatory ones in many respects. 
Some firms will be motivated to exceed minimum standards because such
performance coincides with other firm goals, such as minimising cost or
smoothing product flow, or because they are subject to distinctive pressures
for better performance from workers, customers or neighbouring residents.
As these firms improve measurably, they demonstrate possibilities for simi-
lar firms, and give the stakeholders in these other firms and the regulators
a basis for demanding more of them.
Some compliance judgments may be binary (turning on whether the actor
has met a fixed threshold), but others will rank the actor on a scale that per-
mits comparison both with its own past performance with the performanc-
es of peers. Minimum standards may ratchet up as leading performers raise
expectations. Or standards may require a minimum quantum of improve-
ment over past scores. The regulator or an industry trade association col-
lects and disseminates information about ‘best practices’ associated with the
highest performances. The remedial aspects of the programme tend to be
less punitive than those associated with command-and-control regulation.
Lagging actors are asked to diagnose themselves and formulate improve-
ment plans, perhaps with technical assistance from the regulator. They are
subjected to increased monitoring. Publication of their performance ratings
may generate shaming pressures within the industry or more tangible
responses from customers or investors. Continued severe performance fail-
ure may result in more punitive intervention, but the typical pattern of
intervention is less one of gradually increasing harshness, and more one of
prolonged cooperative intervention followed, in the most intractable cases,
by complete exclusion of the actor or forced restructuring.
‘New accountability’ school governance programmes as pioneered in
Texas, Kentucky and North Carolina, and partly mandated by the federal
No Child Left Behind Act have a similar structure.41 The federal statute
does not prescribe substantive standards or practices. Instead, it requires
states to set their own goals for their schools and then to develop measures
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41 See James Liebman and Charles Sabel, ‘A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform’ (2003) 28 New York University
Journal of Law and Social Change 183.
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to make schools accountable for efforts to fulfil the goals. State systems
must develop standardised tests to measure attainment of their own goals,
and must also test their students on a uniform national test. They must
report the performance of each school overall and with respect to ethnic
minorities, economically disadvantaged, and disabled sub-groups. All
schools are expected to annually review their performances and plan for
improvement. 
Local education agencies must publish annual ‘report cards’ comparing
the performance of each school with schools across the state with socio-eco-
nomically comparable student populations. The agencies must provide
reward to high performers and technical assistance to laggards in drafting
and implementing improvement plans. Where low performing schools fail
to improve, students acquire rights to transfer to other schools or to use
their share of federal support for the school to purchase educational servic-
es of their choice. Persistent poor performance ultimately requires that the
schools be reconstituted with new management.
The main contours of these programmes strongly resemble key features
of TPS.
A. Purposes
Important features of these regimes seem designed neither to resolve dis-
putes nor to vindicate accepted values, but to induce learning and innova-
tion. These include the features that oblige the actors to define and justify
their own standards and practices, to make them public in a way that per-
mits others to observe their experience, and to continuously revise them in
the light of shared experience. The regimes are designed to induce perform-
ance by some actors at a higher level than anything the norms currently
specify. 
In addition to continuous revision, the rules require special responses to
problems—indicators of failure or potential for improvement in the system.
There are three types of such indicators: First, relative performance scores on
measures used in periodic audits, for example, the number of unplanned
shutdowns at a power plant or student scores on a standardised test. Second,
observations or test results indicating failure to comply with applicable prac-
tice norms, including both agency mandatory rules and the firm’s plans. And
third, abnormal events, near misses and breakdowns—for example, the acci-
dental discharge of a hazardous substance in the workplace.
Poor performance on any of these indicators may lead to sanctions and
dispute-resolution procedures. But the most prominent and characteristic
response the systems prescribe involves neither. The firm, often in collabo-
ration with the regulator, must investigate and develop changes designed to
improve its performance. The demand is for improvement, not necessarily
for vindication of a pre-existing norm. Minimum standards have to be met,
but the demand for improvement may require considerably more. The
ethos of these regimes is hostile to the ‘compliance orientation’ that takes
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meeting fixed standards as adequate. Moreover, the decision-making pro-
cedure contemplated for investigation and reform is consensus both with-
in and between the regulatory agency and the firm.
Of course, these systems are nested in larger structures that include rules
with mandatory standards requiring performance in accordance with cur-
rent norms and procedures for non-consensual dispute resolution. A system
in which these mandatory standards and non-consensual procedures played
a dominant role, however, would be regarded by its designers as a failure.
Nevertheless, a theorist might want to reserve the terms ‘law’ or ‘legal sys-
tem’ for these more traditional norms and insist that the Toyota-style norms
represented a non-legal form of social order. There would be significant
costs to doing so, however. At an abstract level, the Toyota norms have sig-
nificant kinship with the more traditional ones. They are both public sys-
tems of deliberate social order based on rules and related norms. Moreover,
the Toyota-style systems are typically regarded by their designers and par-
ticipants as alternatives to the more traditional systems.
B. Rules and standards 
In all these systems, we find an emphasis on specified norms coupled with
a duty to revise them continuously. Plans and performance measures should
be as specific as possible. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points food
safety plans, for example, must specify safety practices in detail, precise tol-
erances for problem indicators such as salmonella, and precise corrective
actions when tolerances are exceeded. Yet, corrective action is a matter of
re-assessment as much as enforcement. The norms should be re-written
when experience indicates they can be improved.42
As in TPS, the systems sometimes give rank-and-file workers the duty 
to provoke reconsideration of a practice norm whenever its application
would defeat its purposes. Institute of Nuclear Power Operation standards
provide:
If the individual actually performing the activity cannot or believes he should not
follow the procedure governing that activity as written, he shall place the
system/component into a stable and safe condition and inform the responsible
supervisor. Situations such as this could occur if the procedure is found to be
inadequate for the intended task, if unexpected results occur, or if two more pro-
cedures governing the activity conflict. The supervisor shall resolve the discrepan-
cy in the procedure by either [determining that the procedure is in fact adequate
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42 US Dept. of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service, ‘Pathogen Reduction; Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) Systems’ 61 Fed Reg 38805 38816 (25 July
1996) (‘[In the course of corrective action, t]he HAACP plan itself might require modification,
perhaps in the form of a new critical limit, or of an additional [Critical Control Point].’)
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or] submitting a procedure change... (no further procedural steps shall be accom-
plished until the procedure change is approved).43
In new accountability school reform, performance is measured precisely on
standardised tests, but the tests are continuously revised as understanding
of goals changes or as knowledge of how to measure goals improves.
Administrators and teachers make and revise detailed plans for improve-
ment at the district, school, and classroom levels.44
C. Interdisciplinary teams
The regulatory regimes contemplate problem-solving by interdisciplinary
teams. For example, OSHA recommends for the required investigation of
an unplanned release of hazardous chemicals:
A multi-disciplinary team is better able to gather the facts of the event and to ana-
lyze them and develop plausible scenarios as to what happened, and why. Team
members should be selected on the basis of their training, knowledge and ability
to contribute to a team effort to fully investigate the incident. Employees in the
process area where the incident occurred should be consulted, interviewed or
made a member of the team. Their knowledge of the events form a significant set
of facts about the incident which occurred.45
The Texas education statute requires site-based management teams with
representatives of administrators, teachers, campus staff, parents and com-
munity members. Reformers emphasise collaboration among teachers both
within and across departments and between teachers and administrators.
The new system generates two distinctive pressures for collaboration. First,
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43 Institute of Nuclear Power Plant Operation, Good Practice, Conduct of Operations (July
1984) 18–19 (quoted in Rees, n 40 above, at 82). The rule continues: 
In cases of emergency when procedures are inadequate for the situation, plant operations
personnel are directed to take such action as necessary to minimize personnel injury and
damage to the plant, to return the plant to a stable, safe condition, the to protect the health
and safety of the general public and the personnel on site. These actions shall be document-
ed and, if appropriate, incorporated into a revision of the affected procedure.
44 Liebman and Sabel, n 41 above, at 249–50.
45 29 CFR 1910.119, Appendix C, para 12. An earlier version of the rule specifically recom-
mended that each team include:
—A third-line or higher supervisor from the section where the incident occurred;
—Personnel from an area not involved in the incident;
—An engineering and/or maintenance supervisor;
—The safety supervisor;
—A first-line supervisor from the affected area;
—Occupational health/environmental personnel;
—Appropriate wage personnel (i.e., operators, mechanics, technicians); and
—Research and/or technical personnel. 
(US Dept of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Proposed Rule, 55 Fed
Reg 29, 150, 29172)
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performance assessment with standardised tests requires each school to
teach a standard set of skills and knowledge, and this means that within the
school, teachers must coordinate their teaching to ensure the proper cover-
age. Second, the aspiration to respond quickly to information gleaned in the
course of the school year requires various forms of collaboration. Students
or teachers may need to be re-assigned; new teacher training may need to
be arranged; curriculum may need to be adjusted to increase emphasis on
some skills and reduce emphasis on others.46
D. Destabilisation
These systems incorporate benchmarking and root cause analysis practices.
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operation disseminates rankings of
nuclear plants based on performance indicators. Plants are distributed
across five categories ranging from ‘Excellent’ to ‘Marginal’.47 The Texas
Educational Accountability System publishes a similar set of rankings of
Texas schools grouped in socio-economically homogeneous peer groups.48
The practices of the most successful performers are often publicised.
Observers of both regimes find that these activities have a powerful influ-
ence both in motivating performance through honour and shame and in dif-
fusing knowledge about ‘best practices’.
Corrective action plans are based on root cause analysis. They are most
elaborate in nuclear safety, where ‘significant operating event’ investiga-
tions often lead to changes in operations, maintenance, training and admin-
istration.49
A recent controversy involved in the implementation of the HAACP sys-
tem by the Food Safety and Inspection Service parallels issues MacDuffie
identified in auto plant TPS implementation and illustrates the stakes in
root cause. Meat tainted by e-coli H 057 was found at Gallison Wholesale
Meat Company in Montana in 2002. The Food Safety and Inspection
Service inspectors encouraged a recall and demanded corrective action from
Gallison. However, the inspectors failed to make efforts to trace the meat
back to Gallison’s suppliers to see if the taint had originated with them.
Operating on traditional assumptions, the inspectors assumed that it was
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46 See Charles A Dana Center, Driven to Succeed: High Performing, High Poverty,
Turnaround Middle Schools (Austin, TX: Charles A Dana Center, 2002), available at
<http:www.utdanacenter.org/downloads/products/driven/ms_vol1.pdf>
Judges are not central participants in the regimes considered here. Thus, the regimes do not
alter the judicial role. An example of a reform in the spirit of TPS in which courts are central
and judges become members of interdisciplinary teams—highly controversial in part for this
reason—is the drug court. See Dorf and Sabel, n 11 above.
47 Rees, n 40 above, at 98–10.
48 Liebman and Sabel, n 41 above, at 241.
49 See Rees, n 40 above, at 126–50.
Ch 02.qxd  3/15/2006  6:52 PM  Page 60
the wholesaler’s responsibility to guarantee the safety of the meat, whether
the taint originated from its own processes or those of its suppliers. After a
critical report from the Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General
insisted that HAACP required tracing back, FSIS revised its regulations to
require it in such circumstances. Now problems such as this potentially
implicate the entire supply chain.50
E. Prospectivity and remediation 
These regimes are oriented toward problem solving, as opposed to blaming
or punishment. The search for causes is more a search for improvement
opportunities than an effort to assign blame. One finds a combination of
soft incentives—shaming and honour—with extremely hard ones for per-
sistently poor performers. When improvement seems unlikely, the regimes
prescribe management change, facility shutdown or license revocation. 
But purely punitive sanctions are typically not a direct part of the regime.
They stand in the background, threatening intervention in cases of deliber-
ate malfeasance, especially withholding and falsification of data. The system
designers tend to bracket or sublimate such concerns. Punitive interventions
are relegated to separate sub-systems of norms, not typically referred to in
the regimes’ self-descriptions, and often assigned to different personnel.
This de-emphasis reflects assumptions that non-compliance is more often
the result of incapacity than malfeasance and that the prospect of punish-
ment deters the cooperation on which the regimes depend.51
F. Death penalty administration 
Regulatory approaches that resonate with TPS may not be promising for all
spheres, but their range has yet to be mapped. There’s a tendency to think
they are not well suited to issues that are highly charged morally. While
there is something to this contention, consideration of Jim Liebman’s pro-
posals for reform of death penalty administration suggests that it is over-
stated.52
Liebman’s proposals emerged from his extensive empirical study showing
that, in about two-thirds of all cases imposing the death penalty, reviewing
courts find errors sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief. This relief
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50 US Dept. of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region, ‘Audit Report:
Food Safety and Inspection Service Oversight of Production Process and Recall at Conagra
Plan (Establishment 969)’ (Sept. 2003) at 43–48.
51 See, eg, 29 CFR 1910 119, App C, para 12:
The cooperation of employees is essential to an effective [workplace hazardous substance]
incident investigation. The focus of the investigation should be to obtain facts, and not to
place blame.
52 James Liebman, ‘The Overproduction of Death’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 2030.
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comes in a procedure that typically takes many years, often decades, and
includes multiple rounds of review in each of the state and federal court
systems. 
Liebman showed how the current system is structured to ‘overproduce’
death sentences: Prosecutors get political capital (a reputation for toughness
on crime) and procedural advantages (the opportunity to death-qualify the
jury) from seeking the death penalty. Elected state court judges face a polit-
ical price for checking their excesses. Neither prosecutors nor judges face
much reputational cost when wrongful convictions for which they are respon-
sible are identified because the system makes no effort to connect the mistakes
with those who are responsible for them and because mistakes are discovered
so long after they are made that the responsible actors are likely to have
moved on. Prosecutors, judges, and juries take their responsibilities toward
the accused casually because they believe (with some plausibility) that any
errors they make against the accused will be remedied post-conviction.
Publicly provided defence resources at trial are inadequate. Although there
is a talented private bar specialising in death penalty cases, it is forced by
its small size and limited resources to focus on post-conviction challenges,
and hence does nothing to check the tendency of the system to overproduc-
tion at the charging and trial stages.
Liebman’s reform proposal involves a curtailment of the present elaborate
post-conviction review procedures in return for strengthening protections
for the accused at the stages of the trial and the initial state appellate review.
It includes many specific reforms long advocated by defenders, including
enhanced funding and heightened qualifications for defence lawyers, open
access by the defence to the prosecution’s files, a requirement that confes-
sion evidence be videotaped and a prohibition on death-qualifying juries in
the guilt phrase. Two aspects of the package, however, are more distinctive. 
First, prosecutors must explicitly justify their charging decisions, and
state judges must review sentences for consistency with both the prosecu-
tor’s rationales and decisions in other cases. The prosecutorial justification
comes in a statement filed at least 120 days before announcing a decision
to seek the death penalty. Comparative proportionality review is to be
undertaken post-conviction by the state appellate courts.
Second, data with respect to mistakes by courts, prosecutors and defence
attorneys must be compiled in a form that permits comparison across per-
sonnel and jurisdictions and be disseminated. 
These proposals resonate with the Toyota perspective.
First, their goals are partly to induce learning. To be sure, the criminal
justice system as a whole is necessarily strongly focused on dispute resolu-
tion and the vindication of accepted values. As long as the defendant denies
allegations of the indictment, dispute resolution is critical. And just punish-
ment is punishment that conforms to accepted values.
Nevertheless, it appears that, even among people who accept the justice
of the death penalty in the abstract, there is no consensus as to when it
should be imposed. The pattern of charging and sentencing in capital cases
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strikes most observers as erratic and as an affront to widely accepted val-
ues of equal treatment. Liebman’s proposed requirements with respect to
the explanation of charges by prosecutors and proportionality review by
first-stage appellate courts are designed to induce reflection and to generate
information that makes more consistent and thoughtful judgments possible.
The proposals are not an effort to vindicate a consensus, but to make it pos-
sible for one to emerge through the public deliberative efforts of different
courts, each taking account of the others decisions and reasoning.
Second, the proposals are consistent with a Toyota-style response to the
dialectic of rules and standards that has played out in an especially trou-
bling way in this area. Sentencing decisions under discretionary standards
tend to be erratic or discriminatory. When reformers respond with rule-like
sentencing grids in the style of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, they often
compel arbitrary results in cases they fail to anticipate or provide for. (For
years, the Supreme Court could not make up its mind whether due process
in death sentencing was more offended by the looseness of discretion or the
rigidity of rules.) The Toyota approach suggests the possibility of continu-
ously revisable grids. The grids would have only presumptive force.
Departures would be permitted if the decision maker could give reasons for
them, and each departure would be an occasion for consideration (perhaps
by a sentencing commission) of whether the grids could be improved.
Third, although the element of collective decision making is not salient in
the reforms, there is a tendency of the requirements of justification to
encourage more engagement within prosecutorial offices and between trial
judges. The need to publicly justify charging decision and the appellate
review of them for consistency will encourage prosecutorial staffs to devel-
op their practices in a more open and coordinated fashion. While trial
judges will not directly deliberate with each other, they will have more rea-
son and opportunity to take account of each other’s decisions in sentencing
in order to achieve consistency.
Fourth, Liebman’s proposal to generate and publish comparative error
data with respect to prosecutors and courts is an attempt to generate the
destabilising pressures of benchmarking and root cause analysis. The hope
is that rankings will encourage emulation of the most successful performers
and stigmatise the laggards in ways that create pressures to reform. The
attribution of the errors requires a kind of root cause analysis. The overall
tendency of the proposals, which limit post-conviction review in return for
more safeguards in the earlier process, is to reduce reliance on ad hoc end-
of-process adjustment (‘rework’) in order induce improvements in early-
stage routine performance. 
Fifth, by shifting attention from procedures for the case-by-case rectifica-
tion of past errors to systemic reforms for reducing errors, the proposals
have a less retrospective and individualist orientation than conventional
discourse. Capital punishment will always be fundamentally a matter of
corrective justice. But doing corrective justice requires institutional capaci-
ties that cannot be developed only case by case.
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4. A JURISPRUDENCE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING
The jurisprudence suggested by TPS is a jurisprudence of problem-solving.
Such a jurisprudence might overlap substantially with rights-and-principles
and law-and-economics legal theory. It could make ample use of the struc-
tures of moral discourse elaborated by the rights-and-principles theorists
and of both the empirical and analytical techniques of the economists. It
would be considerably less troubled than either of these groups tends to be
about the tensions of its precepts with those of the other, since it wouldn’t
take either as a contender for a comprehensive theory.
However, rights-and-principles theory is primarily preoccupied with
interpretation. A jurisprudence of problem-solving, by contrast, would be
focused more on deliberation. Law-and-economics is primarily a theory of
optimisation of known preferences in known circumstances. A jurispru-
dence of problem-solving, by contrast, would be focused more on discov-
ery—on the ways in which people can deepen their understanding of both
their goals and the possibilities of realising them.
John Dewey’s style of pragmatism offers a philosophical basis for theo-
ries of problem-solving, but it tends to be disappointingly vague about prac-
tical application.53 The engineering ideas and practices associated with TPS
and reflected in recent public law developments might usefully complement
the pragmatist approach and contribute to a problem-solving jurispru-
dence. 
The potential benefits of a jurisprudence of problem-solving extend
beyond the capacity to come to terms with recent developments and regu-
lation and public service delivery. For, as I suggested above, a substantial
range of longstanding concerns of the American legal system do not fit well
with the preoccupations of mainstream legal theory. One set of these con-
cerns is substantive; it is typified by unintentional torts and traditional
health and safety regulation—laws that regulate the unintended conse-
quences of generally beneficial conduct. A major fraction of the conduct
prohibited by these regimes is not plausibly moralised and cannot be
described or identified precisely for deterrence purposes. The other set of
concerns involves organisational liability. Mainstream legal theory has been
developed largely with reference to individuals; it has very few resources for
dealing with the distinctive aspects of organisational liability. Toyota
jurisprudence, which brackets moralism, acknowledges uncertainty, and
takes collective action as paradigmatic, has potentially important contribu-
tions to make in both areas.
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